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ABSTRACT
Non-state space: the strategic ejection of dangerous and high maintenance urban space. Territory, Politics,
Governance. Some commentators have characterized so-called ‘no-go’ areas as sites in which the exercise
of authority is prevented. Here we suggest that many such spaces are produced by state, policing and
citizen repertoires that aim to minimize the costs and risks of engaging, supporting and servicing such
spaces and their populations. In this article, we locate strategies of public spending, policing and political
action that offer a governing logic in which neighbourhoods are essentially subtracted from the
constitution of the city. During such designations, the assurances of citizenship, vitality of civic institutions
and presence of policing may be partially or wholly suspended. We present a framework for the
identiﬁcation of such strategies in which these forms of social, political and spatial exiting are described as
being autotomic in nature – spaces that are ejected in order to avoid losses or further damage to the
body politic of the city in ways akin to the response of certain animals that protect themselves from
predation by shedding a limb or body part. This term adds force and depth to assessments of the ways
both temporary and more sustained exits by policing, management and state servicing are designed in
order to avoid responsibility over or engagement with spaces deemed a threat in order to maintain the
integrity of the remaining, included city.
KEYWORDS
Urban governance, territory, social control, policing, neighbourhoods, urban policy, urban security, anti-social
behaviour
摘要
非国家空间：危险与高维护成本的城市空间的策略性驱逐。Territory, Politics, Governance. 部分评论员将
“不得前往”的地区刻画为主权施作受到阻碍的场域。我们于此主张，诸多这些空间是由国家、警备与公
民的集体施作所生产，旨在最小化涉入、支持和服务这些地方及人口的成本与风险。我们于本文中，定
位公共支出、警备和政治行动的策略，这些策略提供了实质上将邻里从城市组成中去除的治理逻辑。透
过此般指定，公民权的确保，公民机构的活力，以及警备的存在，或可部分或完全中止。我们呈现指认
此般策略的架构，其中这些社会、政治与空间存在的形式，被描绘成本质上是“自主不受控制”的——为
了避免对城市的身体政治带来损失或进一步伤害，以近似若干动物脱除肢翼或身体的一部分以保护自身
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免于猎杀的反应进行驱逐的空间。此一概念，增加了力量与深度来评估当代及更为持续的警备、管理与
国家服务退出，以避免负责或涉入被视为威胁的地区来维系剩馀包含的城市之完整性的方式。
关键词
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RÉSUMÉ
L’espace non-étatique: l’expulsion stratégique du dangéreux espace urbain dont le niveau de besoins est très
élevé. Territory, Politics, Governance. Certains observateurs ont caractérisé des ‘zones d’accès interdit’ comme
des sites où l’exercice du pouvoir est entravé. Cet article laisse supposer que beaucoup de ces espaces sont
délimités par des répertoires de l’État, du maintien de l’ordre et des citoyens qui cherchent à minimiser les
coûts et les risques d’engager et de soutenir de tels espaces et leurs habitants et de fournir des services.
Cet article cherche des stratégies relatives aux dépenses publiques, au maintien de l’ordre et à l’action
politique qui présentent une logique constitutive à partir duquel les voisinages sont en principe soustraits
de l’établissement de la ville. Pendant de telles désignations, l’assurance de la citoyenneté, de la vitalité
des institutions civiques et de la présence du maintien de l’ordre peuvent être partiellement ou totalement
suspendues. On présente un cadre pour identiﬁer de telles stratégies où on décrit les façons sociale,
politique et spatiale de sortir comme autotomique – des espaces qui sont expulsés pour éviter des pertes
ou des dégâts supplémentaires au tissu politique de la ville d’une manière qui ressemble à la réponse de
certains animaux qui se défendent des prédateurs en perdant un membre ou une partie du corps. Cette
expression renforce et approfondit les évaluations des moyens par lesquels on dessine les sorties à la fois
temporaires et plus soutenues à partir du maintien de l’ordre, de la gestion et des services de l’État pour
éviter la responsibilité ou l’engagement envers les espaces, considérés comme une menace aﬁn d’assurer
l’intégrité de la ville incluse restante.
MOTS-CLÉS
gouvernance urbaine, territoire, contrôle social, maintien de l’ordre, voisinages, politique urbaine, sécurité
urbaine, comportement antisocial
RESUMEN
Espacio no estatal: La expulsión estratégica de espacio urbano peligroso y con alto mantenimiento. Territory,
Politics, Governance. Algunos comentaristas han deﬁnido las denominadas áreas restringidas como lugares
en los que se previene el ejercicio de autoridad. Aquí sugerimos quemuchos de estos espacios son producidos
por repertorios estatales, policiales y ciudadanos que tienen como objetivo minimizar los costes y riesgos de
participar en tales espacios y sus poblaciones, y apoyar y prestarles servicios. En este artículo ubicamos las
estrategias del gasto público y las acciones policiales y políticas que ofrecen una lógica gubernamental en
la que prácticamente se extraen los vecindarios de la constitución urbana. Durante estas designaciones
pueden suspenderse parcial o totalmente la garantía de ciudadanía, la vitalidad de las instituciones cívicas
y la presencia de policía. Presentamos una estructura para identiﬁcar tales estrategias en la que estas
formas de salidas sociales, políticas y espaciales se describen como autotómicas en su naturaleza: espacios
que son expulsados para evitar pérdidas o más daños a la política principal de la ciudad, similar a la
respuesta de ciertos animales que se protegen contra la depredación al desprenderse de un miembro o
parte corporal. Este término añade fuerza y profundidad a las valoraciones de las maneras en las que se
diseñan las salidas temporales y más sostenidas por parte de los servicios policiales, estatales y de gestión
con el objetivo de evitar responsabilidades o la participación en estos espacios, que se consideran una
amenaza para mantener la integridad del resto de la ciudad incluida.
PALABRAS CLAVES
gobernanza urbana, territorio, control social, policía, vecindarios, política urbana, seguridad urbana,
comportamiento antisocial
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INTRODUCTION
Urban studies has long been preoccupied with changes in the form and management of public
space, particularly the way its increasing regulation appears to offer insight into social fears focused
on disorder (Gurr, 1968; Pearson, 1987; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999) and the increasing align-
ment of public space with market imperatives (Gottdiener, 2000). A number of themes can be
identiﬁed in this body of work. First, the emergence of forms of privatization of the management
and ownership of public spaces (Davis, 1992), which suggest that its rules of entry have changed
the character of what were ordinarily deemed spaces open to all. Second, an emphasis on con-
sumption is understood to have diminished the role of public spaces as sites of political contesta-
tion, participation and social spectacle that in some cases have also been more aggressively policed
(Low & Smith, 2006; Minton, 2010). Third, urban and community safety agendas have become
increasingly enmeshed with policy objectives focused on reducing disorder and promoting the
economic and physical renewal of neighbourhoods and public spaces (Atkinson & Helms,
2007). Here regimes of social control and policing are connected to economic well-being and a
need to combat the visibility of crimes that might threaten disinvestment or foster social anxiety.
Taken as a whole, these various frameworks have tended to emphasize themes of social control
and access as contested aspects of public space and urban governance strategies, alongside ongoing
concerns about participation and exclusion. Building on this context, we reverse these perspectives
to ask whether many areas of profound social exclusion and damaged cohesion receive harsher and
more exclusionary strategies by stretched or antagonistic political and policy machineries. Going
further, might not the ceding of controls, reductions to core social services and permitted disorder
be adopted as de facto methods for the management of what are deemed to be ungovernable popu-
lations and declining spaces?
In this article, we suggest that withdrawal, avoidance, defunding and ‘managed decline’ have
become latent policies in some jurisdictions; our aim here is to offer a framework for analysing
these processes. Our main argument is that strategies of disinvestment and rejection can be ident-
iﬁed in many aspects of urban management, policing, citizen disengagement and the corporate de-
servicing of sensitive and excluded neighbourhoods. These themes have generated increasing
scholarly interest in recent years, such as the examination by Mukhija and Mason (2013) of the
non/de-annexation of poorer areas adjacent to existing incorporated cities in the US and work
on the unserviced areas of Manila (Shatkin, 2004). These political makings and un-makings of
delineations concerning that which is in or outside geographical control have long been a feature
of urban governance and citizen attitudes to particular spaces but have accelerated following the
market orientations of much of urban governance from the 1970s onwards (Castells, 1997).
Through such operations, socially stressed spaces are informally ejected from the responsibilities
of the body of civic authority – a form of unacknowledged de-annexation that forms the focus of
this article.
The location of autotomic strategies, a metaphor that underlies the key contribution of this
paper, appears to offer a promising framework for understanding how unruly space and abject
or stigmatized urban environments are controlled. Such strategies may take the form of an elective
unburdening of state sovereignty and capital withdrawal that operates over varying scales and
timeframes. As we discuss here, the denial of particular spaces as sites of engagement, participation
or control appears to be embraced at times when such tactics may better maintain the order and
coherence of the remaining city. Thus, citizenship may be accorded a kind of conditional status,
fracturing more coherent understandings of the local/city state where designations of no-go space
(such as restrictions on policing, insurance provisions or services such as taxis and postal or food
deliveries) or reduced maintenance (the defunding public housing or public services) are embraced
on the understanding that the residents or users of that space have foregone rights to inclusion and
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personal safety; this paradoxical thesis of control through abandonment forms the basis of the
analysis we now present.
HISTORICAL STRATEGIES OF INCORPORATION AND EJECTION
Views of the state as a hermetically sealed ‘power container’ have remained dominant in social and
political theory for many years (Mann, 1986; Tilly, 1990). Models of state power tend to privilege
the territorial deployment of force, often disregarding more subtle methods of discipline and con-
trol that go beyond the raw play of force and violence (Foucault, 2008). However, instead of
arguing that an analysis of force by government is simply misplaced in the urban context, we
suggest that there is value in appreciating methods of military-style containment found in expedi-
tionary, colonial and counter-insurgency conﬂicts (Graham, 2010) now used in many urban con-
texts globally.
Military commanders with limited forces at their disposal, large territories to control, and an
indeterminate and resourceful enemy closely monitor the costs and beneﬁts of entering and occu-
pying particularly dangerous spaces. For example, the military ‘cordon sanitaire’, intended by
Woodrow Wilson to create a democratic ‘no-man’s land’ between East and West Europe, was
later elaborated by the US during the Cold War to achieve the wider aim of containing potentially
aggressive forces (Stråth, 2002). The origins of the phrase can be traced to the French medical
term for a quarantine zone aimed at isolating the sick or contagious public from its healthy
counterparts. One of the most famous examples of such practices is the English village of
Eyam in Derbyshire, which agreed to seal itself off from the surrounding population during the
Great Plague of 1666 until the pestilence had passed. Only one quarter of the residents survived,
but the plague did not spread to the surrounding villages, conﬁrming the utility of population
quarantine in epidemic disease control (Byrne, 2008, p. 136).
If we examine institutions of containment and control associated with refugee camps and
reservations, we ﬁnd that both derive from the military state’s strategic desire to conﬁne not
only enemy combatants, but more importantly, entire populations from which insurgent threats
are believed to stem. Thus, the forcible imprisonments of Afrikaner and native African men,
women and children within the ﬁrst large-scale ‘concentration camps’ by the British army during
the BoerWar1 were forerunners of the ‘protected villages’ strategy adopted ﬁrst by the British mili-
tary in Malaya (the Briggs plan) (Mockaitis, 1990) and subsequently, by the US military in Viet-
nam (the Agroville or Strategic Hamlet programme), where entire communities were held
prisoner by government forces in order to prevent the inﬁltration and recruitment of villages
and to deny the enemy shelter.
The use of reserves, reservations and other compulsory settlements as techniques of ethnic con-
centration and cleansing dates back to the colonial occupation of aboriginal lands in present day
North and South America, Southern Africa, South Asia and Oceania. In South Africa, where the
institution of Bantustans was intended to legitimate an Apartheid system through the institution
of ‘native self-government’, these reservations evolved into pseudo-sovereign areas around which
the systematic oppression of the majority Black African population could be more effectively orga-
nized (Evans, 2012). Similarly, in the European context, the emergence of the Ghetto in 16th-
century Venice established an early form of biopolitical control (Wacquant, 2008). The revival
of the ghetto by the Nazi state as a compulsory geography of abjection seems at odds with the
appropriation of the term in the American context as a kind of elective ethnic community. How-
ever, the transformation of the American Ghetto as a space of escape and relative freedom for
southern blacks into the hyperghetto of declining economic opportunity, prejudice and social
divestment established an increasing de facto spatial apartheid (Massey & Denton, 1998) that
is of course also relevant to our analysis here. In the face of middle-class and white ﬂight, ofﬁcial
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intervention in these spaces was muted at best, and they more often saw signiﬁcant ﬂight of ser-
vices by both governments and populations.
Under both repressive and more liberal state apparatuses, it is possible to identify strategies of
containment and displays of symbolic force against potentially resistant bodies, whether through
the criminal justice system, mental health jurisdictions (Foucault, 2012) or morally inﬂected pro-
grammes targeting drug users (McCann, 2008). Rancière discussed this ‘police’ function of the
state in order to achieve a ‘society [that] is a totality comprised of groups performing speciﬁc func-
tions and occupying determined spaces’ (2000, p. 123). He argues that those who seek to move
from these positions are deemed to present a challenge to social order and the hegemony of the
state. For the ﬁeld of bourgeois or elite politics, the claims of populations labelled as insurgent
or threatening can subsequently be combatted or managed by their apparent unwillingness to
be assimilated into conventional society.
Notions of the ‘policeable’ city thus contrast with more dangerous territories that must be par-
titioned and controlled. The state’s interpretation of dissent is often built around the sense of a
symbolic challenge to its authority that cannot be countenanced due to its necessary claim to be
able to claim sovereign control over all spaces within its jurisdiction. This interpretation can gen-
erate one of two outcomes. First, the functions of policy and policing can be ampliﬁed to enforce
the subjection of spaces and their resident bodies, or second, as we argue here, a similarly powerful
response lies in devising autotomic strategies in which spaces are avoided or abandoned to
reinforce control over a more circumscribed area while demonizing and portraying calls for support
by the population of areas ejected as illegitimate.
To illustrate this ﬁrst type of autotomic response in more detail, we use examples of ‘no-go
neighbourhoods’ in Northern Ireland around the time of the ‘Bloody Sunday’ events in the
early 1970s, and in the second, the more recent history of ‘dangerous’ neighbourhoods in the his-
toric centre of Mexico City. In the ﬁrst case, we examine how military evolved practices of con-
tainment and armed intervention were used against so-called hostile civilian communities in the
wake of the failure of ordinary police deployments. The choice of Northern Ireland is intended to
be illustrative rather than a limited case. Had space permitted, we might have included equally
relevant examples of militarized ‘retreat and surge’ style tactics that have been adopted by the
police and national guard in prolonged periods of urban unrest in jurisdictions such as the US
from the Watts riots in California of 1965 to the more recent events of Ferguson, Missouri
and the wider #blacklivesmatter protests across urban America. Northern Ireland during the
era of the Troubles thus serves here a heuristic device or prototype of the normalization of excep-
tional state violence and what writers such as Graham (2009) and Weizman (2007) have termed
the emergence of ‘killing space’ or ‘kill space’ where no necessary distinction is to be made between
enemy combatants and the surrounding civilian population.
Our choice of Mexico City aims at highlighting another aspect of autotomy that relates to the
strategic segregation of the policed/policeable city from the unpoliced/unpoliceable city according
to Ranciere’s formulation. As we shall see in the case of La Merced district, here ejection takes the
form of strategic divestment and abandonment through the inadequate provision of public services
and infrastructure and weak/selective law enforcement. At the same time, this marginal space close
to the formal political and commercial centre of Mexico City remains potentially incorporable
through state-led gentriﬁcation and exceptional state interventions against the informal land hold-
ing economy that sustains this complex semi-licit economy. These liminal spaces, many of which
exist in the rapidly growing metropoles of the Global South, thus have a vitality and dynamism
that is simultaneously the product of an underground economy and a transient population,
which both challenges the formal economy and political power while offering the potential for
proﬁtable incorporation and absorption.
Our case studies are thereby intended to offer insights into why and how no-go spaces are
demarcated, and critically, how strategies of ejection may give rise to powerful methods of
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governance, despite their paradoxical implementation by apparently sovereign powers. In order to
situate the practice of autotomy within a broader understanding of the strategic control of sui gen-
eris ‘state space’, we begin with a brief discussion of public space before moving to our two case
examples.
INCLUDED, EXCLUDED AND REJECTED SPACES
Deﬁning public space is problematic, as it is generally accepted to be space not necessarily publicly
owned, but which is publicly accessible. Such notions are inherent in the policies and practice
statements in countries like the UK, where public space management is now intimately connected
with approaches to liveability, economic development, and particularly to crime control (Atkinson
& Helms, 2007). For Low and Smith (2006), public space is a historically complex and contested
phenomenon ‘bound up with the contrast between public and private space’ (p. 4). They then turn
to debates about civil society, state, market and the difﬁculties associated with complex forms of
public and private micro management and ownership implemented in many public spaces. Like
other commentators, they argue that fundamental collective rights to protest and dissent are
unthinkable without public space. However, the legal basis of many public spaces has changed
via leasing to private developers in numerous cities, including Melbourne, Sydney, Los Angeles,
New York, London, Birmingham and Shefﬁeld (Minton, 2010). In many cities, what was once
public has been ceded to private control by resident and developer/management bodies. Even
where many streets and squares remain in public ownership, innovations like Business Improve-
ment Districts in the US and UK or the use of Street Wardens have blurred the traditional bound-
aries of management. Security is also provided privately in many public areas, so that safety has
become less of a public right (Zedner, 2003), and in some cases access to security is becoming
a kind of club good, brokered by the ability to afford entry to bubbles of safety in predictable
and secured spaces (Hope, 2000). Despite public space appearing to be an open and shared
asset, our social backgrounds offer particular vantage points from which avoidance behaviours
(of particular neighbourhoods) and security measures are implemented (San-Juan, Vozmediano,
& Vergara, 2012).
Assimilationist techniques appear more likely to be attempted and to succeed where
counter-public space is adjacent to or at least within strategic range of ‘policeable society’.
Where assimilation and integration may seem impossible to sustain, too costly to implement in
terms of redevelopment or policing, or unlikely to yield a planning gain in terms of tax receipts
or land-value appreciation, we argue that the resultant containment strategy is more likely to
take the form of the ghetto-camp, where a suspension of norms and rules is tolerated alongside
violent periodic police interdictions aimed at restoring the authority and dignity of the state.
We acknowledge that these themes are long-standing but suggest that debates about the nature
of contemporary public space have tended to stress either the punitive control and paciﬁcation
of space (Allen, 2006; Smith, 1996) or its ongoing role as a site of cosmopolitanism and encounter
(Anderson, 2000; Bannister, Fyfe, & Kearns, 2006). Widely shared understandings of public
space as ungovernable, dangerous and which prohibit the presence of outsiders may instead
drive responses of formal ejection, rather than more expensive methods of control or the deploy-
ment of lengthy programmes with the objective of achieving some form of social inclusion (though
we acknowledge the ambitious nature of such programmes in certain jurisdictions). Daily policy
decisions, particularly at the level of local governments, policing departments or forces and by
other citizens may take the form of defunding of capital projects and services, curfews, the with-
drawal of policing actions (Keith, 1991; Lea, 2002) or everyday voluntary decisions to avoid such
spaces by non-residents.
The resulting patchwork of included and rejected spaces recalls the kinds of spatial injunctions
and legal frameworks of Agamben’s (1998, pp. 104–105) notion of the ban in the customs and
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laws of German antiquity. We can extend Agamben’s notion of peaceless ( friedlos) spaces,
whereby state institutions produce new forms of encampment subtracted from the socio-political
formation of the city and in which residents are subjected to extra-legal forms of policing or its
suspension. Such designations exist in the portrayal of the slums that emerges in cinematic treat-
ments like Elite Squad or Bus 174, in which residents are deemed compliant with drug dealers and
available as collateral damage by paramilitary police units – a practice conﬁrmed in more recent
sociological studies of marginal urban spaces in São Paulo (Feltran, 2011). In other words, peace-
less, ejected space exists as a hidden element of the broader ‘matrix and nomos [law] of the political
space’ (Agamben, 1998, 166).
Camp-like spaces constitute exceptional sites where inhabitants are afforded only the status of
‘bare life’ in which the normal operation of law, regulation and social support is suspended
(Agamben, 1998). Yet such impositions are never complete or enduring. This is because strategies
of encampment – from the management of prisons and detention centres to the policing of ghet-
tos, slums and unruly areas – are highly labour and capital intensive and prone to failure and crisis.
Similarly, the counter-publics and insurgent spaces identiﬁed by local governments, citizens and
service providers can never be entirely excluded – by police crackdowns, housing policies and so
on. Therefore, we suggest that intense, constant and forceful interventions in ‘hard to police’
unruly public spaces give rise to an identiﬁable and opposing logic based on a process of rejection
in which state, policy and policing interventions are absented from such spaces. Such autotomic
strategies are made manifest in temporary or sustained de-policing, the withdrawal of private ser-
vices (taxis, insurance services) and the wider avoidance of areas by the respectable citizenry outside
such ‘no-go’ areas. It is to the concrete manifestation of such spaces that we now turn.
MODES OF ENCLOSURE, ANNEXATION AND AUTOTOMY
Autotomic practices and discursive formations tend to build on longer-running narratives sur-
rounding the idea of ungovernable and deviant no-go spaces and populations, which are often
‘ruled’ by dangerous groups. In the UK, this kind of reaction can be traced back to the early
1970s, when the question of Republican enclaves in Northern Ireland was the source of much
anxious discussion in Westminster. References to no-go areas were then picked up again by the
press and parliament in the early 1980s in relation to the question of the inner cities, policing
and the series of signiﬁcant ‘disturbances’ in Bristol and Brixton, London. In these contexts,
the very idea of a space where agents of state control could not be sent other than en masse
and of ungovernable populations was seen as an untenable threat to the functions and dignity
of government and the law (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 2013). These and
other states of emergency that generate declarations of autotomic reactions to dangerous spaces
and counter-publics (most recently, the temporary drawback of policing in the immediate after-
math of the 2011 riots, The Guardian/LSE, 2011, pp. 18–20) provide a rich space to develop
ideas about the nature, limits and priorities of urban studies.
Discursive responses that underlie processes of autotomy can be located in media and political
actors’ descriptions of decaying public spaces, neighbourhoods and streets being ‘taken over’ by the
deviant, in the extensive street presence of the poor, the disorderly or criminal. At times, the
boundaries of these social and economic barriers between the city and its other are literally
made concrete, such as the construction of the notorious Cutteslowe Walls in 1930s Oxford, sep-
arating an existing council housing estate from a new, exclusive, private development using a two
metre high spike-topped wall (Collison, 1963). The enforced abjection of spaces may be further
underwritten by the way welfare sees spatially targeted reductions and by the kind of incarcerating
spaces appended to these strategies (Wacquant, 2008). In this deeper processing of spaces and
populations, a much broader sense of ejection from the polity is achieved by the retrenchment
of welfare programmes, concentrated areas of public housing provision and enormously restrictive
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conditions for those most in need. In other words, autotomic spaces can also be identiﬁed via the
spatial operations of the stripped-down welfare state promoted under conditions of neoliberalism.
Public housing is an important part of this process since it contains and maintains a population
that incites fear, but in spaces that are maintained on increasingly minimal revenue (Macek,
2006). In the following two case studies, we examine these practices in more detail, ﬁrst in an
analysis of ‘no-go areas’ in Northern Ireland around the time of the events of ‘Bloody Sunday’,
and second, in an examination of two informal market districts in the historic centre of Mexico
City.
Case study 1: ‘Free Derry’ and Bloody Sunday
The Northern Ireland conﬂict, known colloquially as ‘the Troubles’, has a long and bitter history
rooted in the legacy of colonialism, religious divisions and armed violence on the part of state and
paramilitary organizations. As the Saville Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry into the events of
30 January 1972, in Londonderry/Derry found, the majority nationalist population in Northern
Ireland’s second largest city had been on the front line of an increasingly violent conﬂict between
the police and the security forces since the riots of October 1968 and the subsequent launch of the
civil rights movement and the creation of the Derry Citizens’Defence Association in 1969. How-
ever, police–community relations within the nationalist community had been identiﬁed as a pro-
blem even before the civil rights movement came into being. As one author writes:
The Catholic community had an ambivalent attitude towards policing. [… ] Three months before the ﬁrst
Derry civil rights march, the Foyle Hill II tenants’ association was campaigning for regular police patrols of
the estate. Six days after the march, over a hundred people gathered outside the Guildhall to protest against
police brutality. (Prince, 2007, pp. 163–164)
The maiden speech of the civil rights activist Bernadette Devlin, elected at the age of 21 as an
Independent Unity candidate for Mid-Ulster, during a by-election in April 1969 put into stark
relief the challenge facing the Stormont government and the British government that would even-
tually be forced to replace it:
Short of producing miracles such as factories overnight in Derry and homes overnight in practically every
area of Northern Ireland, what can we do? If British troops are sent in I should not like to be either the
mother or sister of an unfortunate soldier stationed there. (cited in Coogan, 1995, p. 74)
By August, Devlin was leading ‘the Bogsiders’ resistance in the main war-zone area of Rossville
Street’ from whose high-rise ﬂats young Catholics pelted the police with petrol bombs while
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) responded with CS gas. For the next 48 hours, the rioting
continued with such intensity that Prime Minister Harold Wilson and his Home Secretary James
Callaghan agreed to allow the deployment of troops across the province where in cities such as
Belfast, the situation was closer to a violent uprising (Coogan, 1995, pp. 76–77)
By January 1972, the situation in Derry/Londonderry had become even more serious. By this
stage, the Nationalist community had largely turned against the British military, originally
deployed to protect local Catholics from Loyalist attacks; many believed the Army as well as
the RUC were agents of an oppressive foreign government they refused to recognize. Parts of
the city to the west of the Foyle lay damaged by street battles between the security forces and
groups of rioting youths, some of whom were volunteers of the IRA or its junior wing, the Fianna
(known to soldiers and some others as the ‘Derry Young Hooligans’). A large part of the nation-
alist area of the city (especially the Bogside, dominated by the IRA) became a ‘no go’ area where
ordinary policing could not be conducted and where even the Army ventured only by deploying
large numbers of soldiers (Saville, 2010, p. 49). As Hennessey writes, ‘[t]he process that led to the
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deployment of 1 PARA in Derry on 30 January 1972 began with the State’s frustration that, by
late 1971, Londonderry had virtually seceded from its authority’ (2007, p. 231).
In the year preceding Bloody Sunday, Reverend Ian Paisley, the leader of the Democratic
Unionist Party, wrote an editorial in the Daily Telegraph on 23 March that claimed:
The so-called ‘no go’ areas can be entered by the police with heavy military escorts and the Army can drive
through them at high speed. For the rest, however, they are free from interference by the representatives of
public power. Every writ that is successfully served, every distraint that is successfully carried out and every
arrest that is made is nowadays carefully totted up to be paraded as proof that police authority has been
restored. But the fact remains that crime ﬂourishes within these fortresses.2
Lord Balniel for the government rejected Ian Paisley’s claim that so-called ‘no go’ areas existed in
Northern Ireland (Figure 1):
I can only repeat the assurance which has been given repeatedly that there are absolutely no areas where the
security forces do not go at their will, on foot or in vehicles, for as long as they wish, by day or by night. Of
course, as the hon. Member for Antrim, North and my hon. Friend the Member for Surbiton (Mr. Fisher)
mentioned, there are in certain areas, particularly in parts of Belfast, extreme difﬁculties in keeping order.
That is because there is only limited co-operation from the local residents. If we follow the right policies
and win the co-operation of the local residents, and if gradually they come to look on the police as being
their natural protectors, difﬁculties of restoring order in these areas will be overcome.3
In reply to the Ulster Unionist MP, James Kilfedder’s charge that ‘there are areas in Northern Ire-
land today which are no-go areas’, Prime Minister Edward Heath was rather more circumspect:
The question of the no-go areas is rather wider than the matters Lord Widgery was dealing with. He sets
out very clearly what his terms of reference were, how he interpreted them and how he explained them to all
Figure 1. Scenes around Free Derry Corner before it became a freestanding monument, late summer
1971.
Source: CAIN, University of Ulster.
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those who were concerned in Londonderry and all those who gave evidence. It is desirable that in every part
of the United Kingdom it should be possible for the police to patrol peaceably and maintain law and order
and the freedom of our citizens.4
The Widgery Report was as widely welcomed by Conservative and Unionists politicians as it was
condemned by Nationalist politicians and the bereaved families of the 13 victims of Bloody Sun-
day for ﬁnding that the army had behaved proportionately, lawfully and according to its own rules
of engagement in the face of hostile enemy ﬁre. Edward Heath’s insistence that the territorial
sovereignty of the whole of the UK should be reasserted, if necessary, by lethal force in its Irish
Republican enclaves sought to establish a narrative of ‘normalcy’ between the securitization of
insurgent space and the ‘policed’ community where clearly none existed. As a soldier who took
part in the events of Bloody Sunday told the Saville Enquiry:
There was concern about the containment line following the lines of the barricades. We believed there
would be a reaction out of the IRA because we would be ‘invading their turf’ when going in for the arrest
operation. We therefore had an expectation of IRA activity. There was a large ‘no go’ area and I can recall
seeing maps with the so called containment line marked on them. Beyond those lines the security forces
simply did not go. It was known that ﬁreﬁghts were common in Londonderry as they were in Belfast.
If I remember rightly a policeman had been shot on the Thursday before we went in. (Saville, 2010, p. 458)
The decision to deploy the First Parachute Regiment on the streets of the Bogside against an
unarmed, peaceful, civil rights demonstration as an ‘arrest squad’ was palpably not a policing oper-
ation as the Irish Government drily noted:
The actions of 1 Para itself, the degree of force employed (as measured in terms of civilians dead and
wounded), the absence of any injury to security force personnel, and the description of what happened
as presented by highly credible eye witnesses contrast so starkly with Lord Widgery’s assertion that 1
Para was deployed as an arrest force that it now simply lacks credibility. (Republic of Ireland/Department
of the Taoiseach, 1997, p. 59)
The existence of ‘Free Derry’ and the accumulation of months of hostile headlines and parliamen-
tary questions pointing to the alarming rise of no-go spaces in Londonderry/Derry, Belfast and
many other parts of the Province called forth an exceptional militarized urban security operation
that had previously only been instigated at the time of the ﬁrst Irish Republican risings in 1916,
and subsequently, in a range of colonial counter-insurgency campaigns in South and East Asia, the
Middle East and Cyprus.
The existence of ofﬁcially denied no-go spaces leads inexorably to the erection of walls and
barriers designed to keep hostile publics apart, but these so-called ‘peace walls’ inevitably follow
state containment strategies that seek to separate the policed from the unpoliced and the public
from the counter-public, memorably captured in the photography of Olley and Brett (2007) as
castles along a frontline of defence and enclosure. Various studies have found that such interface
communities suffer social and economic disadvantage, including long-term unemployment, low
educational achievement and poor health, lower levels of car ownership and social mobility. Secur-
itized interface areas are also characterized by the presence of bricked up or derelict buildings,
empty ground or wasteland, grafﬁti and vandalism – a pattern of environmental and social blight
that can be found around other forms of state enclosure from Palestine to the US–Mexico border
(Brown, 2010).
It is therefore unsurprising that the most socially deprived and exclusively Catholic/Republican
and Protestant/Loyalist neighbourhoods in Belfast’s frontier zones where security barriers and
walls have been erected (ostensibly to protect the two communities from one another) also
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experienced the highest rates of civilian casualties during the Troubles. In fact, the vast majority of
fatalities in Belfast during the conﬂict occurred within segregated communities composed of over
90% Catholics or Protestants, within areas of high deprivation as measured by the Robson index
and close to peacelines (Mesev, Shirlow, & Downs, 2009; see also Smyth & Hamilton, 2003,
pp. 30–31).
Of course, it is possible to argue that high levels of concentrated deprivation existed prior to the
Troubles, but this signiﬁes a longer-running issue of religious discrimination and social disadvan-
tage that ﬁrst gave rise to the Civil Rights Movement and out of which emerged the paramilitary
conﬂict. However, it would be a mistake to reduce the Northern Ireland conﬂict to an issue of
‘violent sectarianism’ in the context of a centuries-long strategy of control and containment
where both the state and organized capital have been instrumental. Indeed, despite the Good
Friday Agreement and the subsequent ceaseﬁre by Republican and Loyalist paramilitary forces,
effective policies to tackle the segregation and abandonment of highly deprived communities
failed to win support among political leaders in Westminster and Stormont because highly spa-
tialized inter-communal enmity continues to generate signiﬁcant political capital for all the prin-
cipal players (McDonald, 2011; Parker, 2011).
Case study 2: avoiding and excluding dangerous space in the historic centre of
Mexico city
Mexico City is a place of contrasts that is facing a rise of crime and violence alongside increasing
socio-economic inequality. The chaotic urban development has contributed to the emergence of
dangerous neighbourhoods in the city edges that are not very well known by most citizens
because they are distant. However, there are other types of no-go areas that remain within
areas of economic, tourist and social activities. The historic centre has two of the most notorious
‘no-go’ areas for outsiders: Tepito ‘the ﬁerce neighbourhood’, and La Merced, the largest tra-
ditional food market area in the country. Tepito has a worldwide reputation for commercializing
stolen goods, counterfeit products, drugs, arms or even hit men for hire. Despite its problems,
there is a strong sense of community and pride among its residents, who have kept the neigh-
bourhood out of the authorities’ control and have resisted state intervention for decades. On the
other hand, La Merced, an area for traditional food market distribution, has gained a ‘no-go’ sta-
tus in recent past decades. The area has been in clear decline since a new food distribution centre
was built in 1982; the area was affected during the 1985 earthquake, and a ﬁre in the late 1980s
killed dozens of merchants.
La Merced has also become more dangerous due to a combination of changes in social and
economic dynamics in the city and the increase of organized crime presence, which contributed
to depopulation of the area. Yet we argue that the fundamental factor in these changes has
been the effective abandonment of the state’s investment in infrastructure, security and mainten-
ance of the public market buildings, the public space, and social and cultural facilities, over a period
of years. Since the 1980s, there have been ‘patterns of withdrawal, avoidance and defunding’ in La
Merced. However, its location in the middle of the city still attracts over 100,000 visitors daily. The
economic dynamism of this area can be contrasted with serious problems such as drug and human
trafﬁcking, unsanitary conditions for a large population of prostitutes, and increasing rates of vio-
lence, crime and homelessness.
These problems increased in the 2000s after the implementation of an ambitious regeneration
strategy promoted by Mexico City’s government, in combination with the private sector, which
expelled street vendors, homeless and others out of the touristic area of the historic Centre. A sig-
niﬁcant number of them found space in La Merced. According to Davis, in early 2002, a group of
‘powerful local businessmen hired former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani as a consultant’
(2013, p. 54). The result of his evaluation of Mexico City’s security problems was a strategy of
‘zero tolerance’ akin to New York’s earlier experiments, which meant small crimes would become
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a priority. The local government welcomed the report with 146 recommendations. Critics of the
proposals saw this strategy as a way to criminalize poverty by removing street vending, prostitu-
tion, drug dealers, ‘franeleros’ (people who watch parked cars), the homeless and many other actors
that would affect the image of the city and real estate development interests. One of the main ben-
eﬁciaries of the strategy was Carlos Slim, the telecommunications millionaire with a signiﬁcant
number of properties in the area. The displacement strategy proved successful in terms of revalor-
ization of the touristic perimeter of the city centre, but increased tensions in other areas like La
Merced.
The importance of La Merced as a commercial site existed since pre-Hispanic times
(Castillo-Berthier, 1983). However, the modern marketplace originated as a Mercado popular
(market for the people) in the ruins of the convent of the Order of Our Lady of Mercy in
1861. Since its origins, the commercial success was accompanied by congestion problems for
not having enough space for all merchants. There have been three important interventions: in
the late 19th century, the marketplace was relocated in order to receive more merchants; in
1957, as part of an ambitious public market policy, a new modern building opened; and in the
1980s and 1990s, new commercial ‘plazas’ or shopping malls were built in the area to bring street
vendors inside. However, this last effort was not successful; most of these plazas are used as storage
units, and most of the merchants work in the streets where customers pass by.
The complexity of La Merced as a shopping area includes several public and semi-public build-
ings offering different products from fruits and vegetables to herbal medicine or plastic ﬂowers, sur-
rounded by tower blocks, abandoned buildings, and low-quality housing where illicit activities
happen. The process of regeneration of the touristic part of the historic centre has arguably contrib-
uted to the increase of street vendors in La Merced, creating a barricaded area where most mobility is
now done by metro, buses and walking. The impenetrability of the area is partly due to the presence
of semi-ﬁxed metal stalls that block access to cars. The blockade increased after a huge ﬁre consumed
1000 stalls inside the Nave Mayor in 2013, the main public market building in the area. Merchants
had to be relocated in tents placed in the adjacent streets. The ﬁre exacerbated the tensions between
different groups and conﬂicts increased. Although Tepito and La Merced are some of the most
dangerous areas in the City Centre, actions to combat crime have been limited. There have been
a few raids in Tepito to combat drug trafﬁcking and to conﬁscate pirate CDs and DVDs, but little
that might more effectively challenge such trades. In La Merced, since the construction of the plazas
in the 1990s, there has been a progressive decrease in state presence to deal with insecurity, maintain
public markets or combat organized crime.
After the 2013 ﬁre in Nave Mayor, La Merced, a ‘Master Plan to rescue La Merced’ was
announced, and experts in academic, private, social and public sectors were invited to take part.
Unfortunately, the plan was never published and the overall intentions to improve the conditions
of those who live and work there have not materialized. Those involved in the process of building
the master plan share the frustration over how things were conducted. For starters, the state had
abandoned the area for such a long time that residents and vendors were strongly predisposed
against this type of regeneration project (particularly those who had seen the displacement and
gentriﬁcation of the ﬁrst regeneration strategy). Second, local authorities did not recognize the
immediate needs of stakeholders after the ﬁre, which only fostered distrust and rumours of displa-
cement and destruction. One of the urban planners involved in the project considers that the res-
cue plan had a bad start because it was based on ideas deﬁned on the comfort of a desk, rather than
listening to the real demands that merchants and residents shared during the visits and consul-
tation meetings, such as bad lighting in streets, insufﬁcient policing, deﬁcient waste management,
insufﬁcient sewage capacity, irregular running water provision, insufﬁcient health and safety con-
ditions, and improvised electrical connections. On the contrary, according to this interviewee who
attended all seven public consultation sessions, there was a patronizing attitude of bringing experts
who told the local community what they needed instead of listening to their needs and concerns.
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Another interviewee who was in charge of one of the data gathering teams expressed that most
of the people she encountered during ﬁeldwork felt that the local government had abandoned
them for such a long time, they had to survive on their own terms. The ‘rescue’ project in their
eyes was an excuse to clean streets from informal vendors but also to expel them from the estab-
lished marketplaces. The slow response to reconstruct the burned-down area of over two years has
conﬁrmed their fears. People in the area have taken control of their own problems. Churches look
after the homeless, local cultural initiatives like La Carpa and Keren-tá are looking after the young-
est population, and merchants have united to ﬁght crime in the area, negotiating with delinquents.
The withdrawal of the master plan not only shows the incapacity of the local government to con-
nect with the community, but also the power behind the illegal activities that exist, particularly one
that no one wants to talk about: human trafﬁcking. It seems like there cannot be a ‘rescue’ unless
the state recognizes that it abandoned (Angotti, Becker, & Müller, 2013) the area some time ago
and that this has now created a more sustained threat to the sovereignty of the city government, as
the area has learned to survive apart from the wider body politic.
CONCLUSION
Autotomy refers to the ability of some animals to amputate limbs when threatened by predators in
order to affect escape under such emergency conditions. In this article, we have sought to develop
understandings of public space and city/neighbourhood governance using this metaphor of ejec-
tion as a kind of strategic reﬂex action by threatened governments, citizens and private service pro-
viders. Neighbourhoods are ejected in more or less stringent and modulating ways through the
actions and designations of policing agencies, national and local governments, citizens and private
service providers. The idea of autotomic space thus offers a potentially fruitful means of locating
strategic and temporary cessations of control, patterns of under-spending and policing avoidance,
as well as the process of suspending assurances of citizenship in order to counter the ﬁscal costs of
maintaining control that are more subtle than the designation of simple no-go areas. One advan-
tage of this perspective is that it assists our understanding of how territorial disengagement can be
used as a weapon in the armoury of neoliberal states faced with the growing costs of maintaining
order and social control in ‘unruly spaces’. Such strategies also appear to legitimate state withdra-
wal via resulting spatial stigma, while helping privatize and secure the more protected ‘policed
community’.
We have used the idea of autotomic space to identify the socio-spatial expulsion of neighbour-
hoods and other locales, conducted as a form of triage governance, in order to maintain the health
of the wider urban body politic – ensuring its ﬁscal vitality and safety by cutting off the costs of
maintaining high poverty and unruly districts. This strand of control through policing absences,
ﬁscal foreclosures and citizen avoidances is paradoxical since it stands in contrast to public pro-
nouncements of police/state sovereignty and other assurances of the full and extensive power of
the state and its agencies. The resulting combination of a divestment of public assets, reductions
in public service provisions, disrespectful street-level bureaucrats, police no-go designations, unin-
surable property, low security, little or no public transport and withdrawals of private services (such
pizza and other deliveries, private postal services and so on) has created decaying spaces in which
residents feel a sense of shame or indignity and where surplus populations are warehoused in order
to minimize the ﬁscal ‘overhead’ they represent to the state. These points are in line with recent
arguments about the systemic production of forms of citizen expulsion that emerge via the kind of
privatization, ﬁnancial and land appropriation appearing under advanced neoliberalism. As we
move further into the greater recognition of modes of paradoxical citizenship/spatial abandon-
ment, the lines of crossover between notions of such expulsion and the idea of autotomic space
appear to be fruitful.
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Through our two illustrative case studies, we have sought to elaborate the concept of autotomic
space, arguing that such spatial and social designations are often temporary or shifting in nature –
the no-go areas created by riots may ﬂare up for a day or two, the no-go estate may be de-policed
for months or more, an insurgent province or region cordoned off for several years. Critically,
because of their delegitimizing force in public discourse and discriminatory power, such patterns
are invariably denied by state actors, local authorities, policing agencies and private service provi-
ders. Our case examples, the historic no-go areas of Northern Ireland and the strategic abandon-
ment and failed attempt to reclaim informal commercial and illicit space in Mexico City usefully
illustrate the shifting patterns of engagement, withdrawal and disbarring that form the basis of
powerful autotomic logics in which areas and populations are subject to emergency conditions
of control operating to subtract segments of the body politic from the city. The no-go area
thus exempliﬁes not only resistance to authority as is commonly understood, but also the deploy-
ment of a kind of power that stems from disregard.
The colonization of public space requires an intense and ongoing collaboration of the state
with its policing agents, but this can never be a totalizing or complete solution to disorderly publics
or apparently unruly spaces. Social and territorial domination rely on the capacity to respond with
no response – with a cessation of policing, with ghettoizing forms of housing provision and a will-
ingness to deny citizens their rights. These strategies seem to be applied more often and with
greater vigour in societies and cities characterized by more intense material inequalities and strains
on ﬁscal sustainability. Within a wider social politics that has generated social animosity between
groups in increasingly unequal cities, a search for security by the afﬂuent also appears to aid the
energies of the polity, directed at attempts to neutralize, defund, withdraw or otherwise eject com-
mon spaces in order to pacify and remove possible threats. At the same time, the inhabitants of
stigmatized and defamed neighbourhoods often manifest a strong opposition to state–capital
re-incorporation strategies designed to erase existing oppositional cultural and political identities
and/or the livelihoods of workers and their dependents in the informal and illicit economy.
Through governmentalities of social sorting and highly stigmatizing media narratives of self-
induced poverty and moral failure, marginal populations have been woven into narratives of abject
spaces with little capacity to challenge such descriptions. Autotomic space thus satisﬁes a broader
process of socio-political and economic triage (lose/abandon space to take better control of what is
left) while at the same time serving the ideological purpose of disparaging the victims as agents,
deserving their fate. The kinds of spatial containment produced by such strategies engage scripts of
capital–state encampment and revanchist controls, as unruly publics and spaces become increas-
ingly withdrawn from membership of the polity and the promise of any tangible right to the city.
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NOTES
1. According toWar Ofﬁce data, by the summer of 1901, some 93,940 whites and 24,457 blacks were interned by
British forces in ‘camps of refuge’ in South Africa, where poor nutrition and epidemic disease resulted in annual
death rates of over 6%. The Fawcett Report led to improvements in camp conditions and lower death rates, but
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stopped short of calling for an immediate end to the practice of internment. [Parliamentary Papers, 1901, XLVII,
Cd. 608, Cd. 694], extracts available at http://www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/cd608.html accessed 23
April 2016.
2. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vol 815, 6 April 1971, c354-5.
3. Ibid., c371.
4. Hansard, HC Deb, 19 April 1972, vol 835, c528.
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